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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 18-1083 
____________ 
 
NATIONAL ELEVATOR INDUSTRY HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN BOARD OF 
TRUSTEES 
 
v. 
 
BERNARD MCLAUGHLIN, 
Appellant 
 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No. 3-12-cv-04322) 
District Judge: Hon. Anne E. Thompson 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 27, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed:  May 21, 2019) 
 
_______________________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________________ 
  
                                               
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 Bernard McLaughlin appeals the order of the District Court denying his motion for 
relief from a judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(5).  
He argues that the District Court abused its discretion by not allowing discovery.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm.  
I.1 
McLaughlin was injured in an all-terrain vehicle accident and received an advance 
for medical benefits from the Board of Trustees of the National Elevator Industry Health 
Benefit Plan (the “Plan”) on the condition that he reimburse the Plan should he recover 
from a third party.  McLaughlin received a settlement, but refused to reimburse the Plan.  
The Plan filed suit against McLaughlin to recover funds previously advanced.  The 
District Court awarded summary judgment in favor of the Plan and this Court affirmed.2    
Following the appeal, the Plan filed suit against McLaughlin to monetize the lien 
into a sum certain.  The District Court entered judgment in the amount of $45,347.89 in 
favor of the Plan.  McLaughlin moved to vacate the judgment under Rule 60.  The District 
Court denied McLaughlin’s motion to vacate.  This Court affirmed.3     
In June 2016, McLaughlin filed a collateral civil action against the Plan challenging 
the Plan’s right to enforce a set-off provision and argued that the Plan was required to 
                                               
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132. We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2 Bd. of Trs. of the Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan v. McLaughlin, 590 F. App’x 
154 (3d Cir. 2014) [hereinafter McLaughlin I].  
3 Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan Bd. of Trs. v. McLaughlin, 674 F. App’x 189 
(3d Cir. 2017) [hereinafter McLaughlin II]. 
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reimburse McLaughlin all withheld medical expenses.  The District Court granted the 
Plan’s motion to dismiss on res judicata grounds.  Again, we affirmed.4 
On August 2, 2017, after the time-frame for McLaughlin to file a petition for 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court had expired, the Plan docketed the judgment 
with the New Jersey Superior Court.  Pursuant to that docketing, McLaughlin moved to 
vacate the order of judgment, styled as a Motion for Relief from a Judgment pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(5).  McLaughlin sought relief on two 
grounds: first, that the Plan committed misconduct by filing the judgment lien in New 
Jersey state court under Rule 60(b)(3); and second, under Rule 60(b)(5), that the judgment 
lien had been satisfied through McLaughlin’s employer’s continued contributions to the 
Plan.   
The District Court held that McLaughlin was not entitled to relief under Rule 
60(b)(3) because the docketing of the judgment did not constitute the type of fraud or 
misconduct required under the rule and the motion was well beyond the one-year 
limitations period mandated by the federal rules.5  Moreover, because McLaughlin’s 
motion was untimely, the District Court declined to consider relief under Rule 60(b)(5) or 
to permit discovery.6  This appeal followed.  
                                               
4 McLaughlin v. Bd. of Trs. of Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 686 F. App’x 118 
(3d Cir. 2017) [hereinafter McLaughlin III]. 
5 Bd. of Trs. of Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan v McLaughlin, No. 3:12-cv-04322, 
2017 WL 6550489, *2–3 (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2017). 
6 Id. at *3. 
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II. 
We review a district court’s denial of relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b), with the exception of those raised under Rule 60(b)(4), under an abuse of discretion 
standard.7  Rule 60(b) authorizes relief from a final judgment on six separate grounds.8  
All motions made under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time of the entry of 
the order or judgment.9  Those made under subsection (b)(3) “must be brought within one 
year of the entry of a final judgment. An appeal does not toll this time period.”10   
McLaughlin waited 11 months after we affirmed the judgment lien and 23 months 
after the actual entry of the judgment lien to file for relief from the District Court’s order.  
He first attempts to argue that his challenge is nevertheless timely by arguing that the 
docketing with the New Jersey Superior Court is the appropriate “proceeding” at issue.  
However, as the District Court explained in its well-reasoned and thorough opinion, the 
docketing itself is not a proceeding, nor is it the actual final judgment, order, or 
proceeding from which McLaughlin seeks relief.  McLaughlin also attempts to argue that 
the one-year clock should not have begun ticking until we decided McLaughlin II.  The 
argument is futile because an appeal does not toll this time period.  Accordingly, relief 
under Rule 60(b)(3) is time barred.  
                                               
7 Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008).  
8 In re Bressman, 874 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2017). 
9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). 
10 Moolenaar v. Gov’t of V.I., 822 F.2d 1342, 1346 n. 5 (3d Cir. 1987); see In re Bressman, 
874 F.3d at 149 (noting that motions based on fraud or misconduct are subject to a one-year 
cap or period of limitations). 
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III. 
 Alternatively, McLaughlin argues that he is entitled to relief because the judgment 
lien is satisfied.  Where the judgment at issue “has been satisfied, released, or discharged,” 
the federal rules call for relief.11  Unlike Rule 60(b)(3), Rule 60(b)(5) is not subject to a 
one-year limitations period.  However, a motion filed under Rule 60(b)(5) must 
nevertheless be filed in a reasonably timely manner.12   
As noted above, McLaughlin did not pursue relief until 11 months after we 
affirmed the judgment lien and 23 months after the actual entry of the lien.  Because we 
agree the motion was not filed in a reasonably timely manner, we conclude that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider relief under Rule 60(b)(5) 
or to permit discovery. 
IV. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s well-reasoned order denying relief 
under Rule 60 and preventing discovery substantially for the reasons explained by the 
District Court in its December 20, 2017 opinion.  
                                               
11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). 
12 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). 
